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Bidding for input in oligopoly
Roberto Burguety and József Sákovicsz
January 11, 2016
Abstract
We present a model where rms producing substitutes bid for inputs (es-
pecially labor) in a decentralized market. We show that downstream market
power increases the intensity of competition for input through a new channel:
local competitive foreclosure. In our model each unit of input (worker) is sold
in a separate local market and rms try not just to get it, but also to keep
it from their rivals. This externality leads to rms targeting the same units
of input and the price of these is bid up. This e¤ect mitigates the output
reducing e¤ect of downstream market power and in the limit (linear Cournot
with constant returns) can even restore e¢ ciency. As a result of coordination,
there exist further equilibria, with prices above cost even with price taking
suppliers in the labor application this leads to involuntary unemployment.
When, instead of targeting, rms post prices, coordination no longer plays
a role and we have a unique(!) equilibrium that clears the market, still in-
ternalizing the externality. Finally, we show that targeting can also result in
endogenous market segmentation and price/wage di¤erentials. JEL Codes:
D43, L11, L13.
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for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge 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1 Introduction
Firms often compete with the same rivals in di¤erent, vertically connected, markets:
upstream markets for inputs and downstream markets, where they sell their output.
When these rms have signicant market power, the resulting strategic interaction
can become complex and closely dependent on market microstructure. It is therefore
fundamental to get the latter right (c.f. Roberts, 1987). In this paper, we propose a
novel model of (input) price determination that allows us to shed light on previously
ignored feedback e¤ects from the downstream market.
Our point of departure is the conventional wisdom that rms engaged in multi-
market competition have an incentive to foreclose: to reduce the rivalsproduction
by somehow starving them of input. Models often fail to capture the full ramica-
tions of this observation.1 To illustrate this, ignore for the moment models of vertical
contracting, and instead consider the case where the atomized supply of input is
completely elastic. It may then appear natural though we will argue that perhaps
incorrect to model upstream competition as rms simultaneously choosing quan-
tities (as prices are given). It is then clear that a result of market power in the
downstream market is a lower output, resulting in a lower input demand. Note that
this outcome is the aggregate consequence of two e¤ects of opposing directions. The
dominant of these is that, as a rm with market power impacts on the output price,
it lowers the quantity it puts on the market. The second, mitigating, e¤ect is that,
because its rivals have market power, there is strategic substitutability: increasing
its quantity leads to a lower quantity supplied by its rivals (the best response curves
are downward sloping). We contend that the incentive to increase ones quantity in
order to decrease the rivals is seriously underestimated if we only take into account
1Among the few exceptions, we may cite Es½o et al. (2010), Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1997).
We will comment on these below.
2
strategic substitutability. Consequently, the welfare loss resulting from downstream
market power is signicantly lower than currently believed.2
The problem we see is that this model of competition assumes away the pos-
sibility that the input choices of a rm directly a¤ect the rivalsinput levels. We
believe that this is an unnecessary, and often unrealistic, restriction. To address this
concern, we propose an alternative microstructure that is operational in any supply
context, not just the elastic one assumed above.
The main feature of our model of the (upstream) market is that buyers enter into
simultaneous and independent negotiationsfor exclusive deals with their potential
suppliers, where the latter have xed capacities but there are many of them. The
best example of this is the labor market:3 there are many workers, but each of them
works only eight hours a day and can seldom work for two di¤erent rms. As it is
our focal application, henceforth, we will refer to the upstream market as the labor
market, where rms hire workers.
By targeting specic workers, rms can a¤ect whether the marginal worker they
hire is at the expense of one of their rivals, even when the rivalsstrategies (no longer
quantity choices!) are given. In other words, by directing their demand at the same
workers that the rivals expect to hire, they can potentially reduce the rivalsinput.
When every rm can engage in such poachingactivity, the equilibrium strategies
have to incorporate defensive tactics: competitive foreclosure ensues, magnifying
the increase in competition intensity due to strategic substitutability described
above.
The insights that we obtain are most relevant for labor markets with identiable
individuals, like top management, academics, professionals, etc., where personalized
deals are common. Nonetheless, we will show that our main results continues to
hold when workers are anonymous.
2In fact, in Section 8, we display an example with linear output demand and Cournot down-
stream competition where our model leads to the e¢ cient outcome.
3Nonetheless, our model could equally apply to other markets, for example, retail space, pro-
duce, non-specialized parts, premium advertising slots etc.
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We streamline bargaining by assuming that the rms make take-it-or-leave-it
o¤ers to the workers of their choice.4 Importantly, this mechanism is completely
decentralized: whether or not a worker is hired only depends on her choice when
faced with the wages set for her by the rms.
Our rst result conrms that in the benchmark case, where the rms have no
market power in the product market, the unique equilibrium of our targeted-o¤er
labor market institution leads to the competitive outcome. Next, we show that,
with market power, the competitive outcome cannot occur in equilibrium, but there
exists another market-clearing equilibrium instead. In this equilibrium, rms target
the same workers and this results in an endogenous demand for labor. This demand
exceeds the competitive one as it includes a conjectural variationof  1: the act of
being chosen by a worker over a rival not only increases a rms labor force by one,
but it automatically decreases the rivals labor force by one. Due to this increased
demand, both the still common wage and employment increase. Thus, incentives
to foreclose lead to higher wages and higher employment, partially compensating for
the anti-competitive e¤ects of downstream market power.
It is important to note that this outcome is not an artifact of our assumed
microstructure, as it would also result had we assumed posted prices. Even in
the absence of targeting, the rms know that workers willing to accept their wage
will either work for them or for the rival. For this result, the personalized o¤ers
have served only as a vehicle to make the direct e¤ect of wage o¤ers on the rivals
workforce more apparent.
The above is not the only equilibrium of our model. However, all other equilibria
exhibit even higher wages but lower (though supra-competitive) levels of employ-
ment than the market clearing equilibrium. Consequently, these additional equilibria
are characterized by involuntary unemployment: there are workers not employed by
the rms who would accept to work for less than the market wage. These equilibria
4We can  alternatively  construe this as each rm running a rst-price auction, setting a
personalized reserve wage for each worker and promising to hire them if they submit a valid bid
(which, obviously, will be equal to the reserve wage). For a detailed analysis of this, all-win,
auction, see Burguet and Sákovics (2016).
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arise from the coordination-game nature of the interaction: as rms want to make
o¤ers to the same workers, if the other rms stop targeting a few workers it is a
best response not to make an o¤er to those same workers. Attracting them would
no longer have the added value of reducing the supply of the rival. It is this wedge
between the value of a worker who would otherwise work for the rival and one that
would not, that explains the possibility of wages above reservation wages.5
Our assumption that workers are identiable is relevant for this result. Indeed,
worker anonymity eliminates the coordination-game equilibria with unemployment.
Unsurprisingly, anonymity retains the high-wage, high-employment, market-clearing
equilibrium: as we have discussed, that outcome results when competition is in
posted prices. All rms make the same wage o¤er to all the workers, so they know
that workers willing to accept that wage will either work for them or for a rival,
and thus the equivalence with posted-price competition. Moreover, this is the only
outcome supported in equilibrium. Uniqueness is due to the fact that other outcomes
would induce (non-posted-price)6 deviations, in the form of higher wage o¤ers to
fewer workers. That is, market clearing is not a consequence of downward pressure
of wages, in the hypothetical case that fewer workers were hired at higher wages.
In fact, when we discourage upward wage deviations, the possibility of wages
above market clearing and so involuntary unemployment reemerges. We show
this by appending a second period to the anonymous game and supposing that, even
if workers receiving an o¤er may not be observable, a worker being hired is, and thus
in the second period rms can direct o¤ers at workers hired by their rivals.
Most of our analysis is carried out in a symmetric framework. As a comprehen-
sive analysis of asymmetries is beyond the scope of this article, we content ourselves
with documenting the possibility of inter-industry wage di¤erentials arising in equi-
librium. To that e¤ect, we return to our original, static model with identiable
5Note that we have assumed that product demand and labor supply are independent. This is
in contrast with general equilibrium (macro) models where consumers and workers are the same
that display multiple equilibria and unemployment via di¤erent rational expectations equilibria
(see Silvestre, 1993, for an excellent survey).
6With only posted prices, there would be a large multiplicity of equilibria (c.f. Dastidar, 1995).
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workers, and suppose that now four rms competing in the same labor market
are of two types, each selling their products in one of two identical but independent
markets. As in the symmetric case, there exist a continuum of equilibria, but only
two of them result in equal wages across industries. What occurs in all other equilib-
ria is endogenous market segmentation: rms that share the same product market
target the same workers, while rms from di¤erent product markets target di¤erent
workers. This results in a coordination game across industries, with multiple ways
in which to share labor in equilibrium.
All the above results are derived for a general, unspecied production function
and downstream market interaction. To illustrate our ndings, we end our essay by
working out an example for the downstream market with di¤erentiated-good price
competition and constant returns to scale technology.
There is an extensive literature on foreclosure (see Rey and Tirole, 2007, for an
excellent survey), mainly concerned with vertical contracting. In that literature,
downstream rms with market power also have an incentive to lure upstream rms
into contracts that make it harder for rivals to obtain their inputs. The focus there
is on whether these incentives are stronger than upstream rmsown incentives not
to enter into these deals, or on the contractual forms that may a¤ect competition to
the contracting partiesadvantage.7 Instead, we have in mind an upstream market
where suppliers do not possess market power, but cannot sensibly deal with more
than one buyer. Foreclosure here appears through quantity purchases, rather
than through from a competition law point of view possibly problematic vertical
restraints.
The literature see Bhaskar et al. (2002) and the references there also provides
abundant evidence of both wage di¤erentials and wages above reservation values.8
7Another strand of this literature focuses on competition among upstream rms with market
power, and how this may be a¤ected by contracting tools in their deals with downstream, typically
competitive retailers.
8Of course, e¢ ciency wage models rank high as explanations of these phenomena. (See, for
instance, Yellen, 1984.) Here, we have assumed away all traditional motives behind the rationale
for e¢ ciency wages.
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Some theoretical explanations have been o¤ered for these phenomena. Related to
this paper, Shy and Stenbacka (2015), like us, allow for personalized wage o¤ers
to workers. Their motivation is poaching or anti-poaching policies when switching
workers are a¤ected by both a productivity change and a worker specic cost
of switching. Switchers may obtain wages above the wages of stayers, so that wage
di¤erentials result from switching frictions. Our inter-rm wage segmentation, on
the other hand, results from output market externalities.
Other studies have related product market imperfections with unemployment
when labor (union) has bargaining power in wage negotiations.9 This bargaining
power allows workers to capture part of rmsrents in the output market, and so
drive wages above reservation wages. In our model, workers are price takers. (In
fact, our model has equilibria where workers appropriate no rents.) Wages are above
reservation wages as a consequence of rmsattempts to capture competitorsrents.
Kaas and Madden (2004) also analyze the feedback between product and input
market power, and also obtain the possibility of unemployment as an equilibrium
outcome. Firms rst post wages and then, after observing all choices, announce
a maximum amount of labor they are willing to hire at their posted wage and,
possibly, rationing follows. This two-stage competition for labor allows high wages
to be equilibrium: any deviation downwards triggers a punishment by other rms
in the form of large demands of labor that drives the deviator out of the market.
These punishments themselves are sustained by the threat to a failing punisher
of being also driven out of the market. Thus, in a sense unemployment is the result
of collusion among rms, with collusion-type mechanisms to sustain it.10 We do not
need this particular, two-stage model of the labor market or the endogenous wage
rigidities that it postulates at the time employment o¤ers are made. Rather, high
wages are the consequence of rms ercely competing with alternative employers
that are also output market competitors.
9See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Koskela and Stenbacka (2012) and Booth (2014) are recent
exemples of this literature.
10They require to have at least three rms competing, so that each deviant is disciplined by (at
least) two punishers, each one disciplining each other.
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A few papers have modeled the interaction between general input and output
markets when rms have market power in both.11 Stahl (1988) is perhaps among the
rst to analyze the e¤ect on output market outcomes of intermediariescompetition
for upstream inputs. Intermediaries compete in prices for inputs that then are sold
downstream. Price competition leads to no unemployment, by denition: all sup-
ply at the posted price is assumed to be taken by the intermediary making the o¤er.
When ties are broken in a particular way (one winner takes all even when tying),
then the output price may be larger than Walrasian, but one-price, market clearing
in the input market is always guaranteed. More recently, Es½o et al. (2010) discuss
quantity competition in this same setting, but assume exogenous (inelastic) supply
of input and e¢ cient allocation of this input to rms. Also in the same tradition,
Yanelle (1997) studies a model of bank competition that shares some interesting
features with the present one. She also obtains that there is a range of equilibria,
at di¤erent prices (rates) for funds. When banks and borrowers (entrepreneurs)
compete with each other for funds, lenders face a coordination problem: borrowers
and banks can fulll their o¤ers if they get su¢ cient other lenders on board. Thus
multiplicity ensues. We also obtain a multiplicity of price equilibria for inputs as
the result of a coordination problem, but in our case input buyers, not their sellers,
are the ones that face this problem. Competition in the output market is the origin
of the externality in the input market.
Our model could be interpreted as each worker auctioning o¤ her services. In
this sense, it is related to McAfee (1993), Peters and Severinov (1997), Burguet and
Sákovics (1999), Julien et al. (2000), and De Fraja and Sákovics (2001), among
others. All these papers consider similar institutions involving personalized wage
o¤ers, with the main di¤erence that they all assume that each buyer can participate
in a single auction (bid for a single worker). Thus, wage di¤erentials (intra- or
inter-rm) are a consequence of di¤erent realizations of (mixed-strategy) equilibria
participation in these auctions. On the contrary, in our model, rms are allowed to
make (and required to honor) o¤ers at several auctions simultaneously.
11The literature on inter-market interactions when rms act in multiple output markets is abun-
dant. A classical reference here is Bulow et al. (1985).
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Finally, note that our model is distinct from those that also model competing
retailersbidding for input but consider the supplier as a monopolist (Marx and
Sha¤er, 2007, 2015, Miklos-Thal et al., 2011, Rey and Whinston, 2013). Here each
retailer has a single possible contract, so foreclosure equates exclusion. Also they
are concerned with reaping the industry monopoly prot in equilibrium, which is far
from feasible in our model. If we considered a trade union responding to the o¤ers
of the retailers, we would not have the internalization of the external e¤ect, which
is the basis for our result.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of labor market
competition and the (reduced form) model of product market revenues. In Section
3, we analyze the benchmark case where rmslabor decisions do not a¤ect other
rms revenues, and obtain competitive (labor market) outcomes for this model
of labor market competition. Section 4 then introduces output market interaction
and obtains a (non-competitive) market clearing equilibrium outcome for this case.
Section 5 studies other, symmetric equilibria where the wage is even higher, and
above the reservation value of non employed workers. In Section 6 we discuss how
the results change when rms cannot target their wage o¤ers. Section 7 studies the
case in which all rms compete for workers, but then operate in di¤erent output
markets, and shows that wage di¤erentials may be an equilibrium outcome. Section
8 discusses micro-foundations for our revenue functions, and Section 9 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The base model
There are two symmetric rms competing both in the labor and product markets.
Labor is measured in e¢ ciency units, denoted by t, for talent. The measure of labor
hired by Firm i is denoted by ti, i = 1; 2. To avoid technical issues arising from
indivisibilities, we do not model workers embodying varying measures of e¢ ciency
units, rather we assume that there are a continuum of identically productive nano-
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workers, indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. Their  exogenous and common knowledge12 
reservation wages imply an aggregate supply function of labor, denoted by S 1(w),
w.l.o.g. assumed to be weakly increasing in wage, w, so that its inverse is the inverse
aggregate supply function13 S(t1 + t2) > 0.
The labor market operates as follows: each Firm i sets a deterministic and
Lebesgue measurable wage schedule, Wi(z), z 2 [0; 1], specifying a personal wage
o¤er to each (nano-)worker.14 Let W denote the full prole of wage schedules.
The workersdecisions are simple: they observe their o¤ers, and accept (one of)
the highest if it is no less than their reservation wage. When they are indi¤erent,
the existence of an equilibrium may require that the workers (mixed) strategies
break ties in some appropriateway. Unless otherwise indicated, we consider the
(symmetric) strategy where, in case a worker has more than one acceptable highest
o¤ers, she randomizes among them with equal probabilities. That is, a worker,
who receives a highest acceptable wage o¤er from both rms, accepts each with
probability 1
2
. Note that, since Wi(z) is measurable, given W the set of workers
that receive an o¤er w from Firm i above their reservation wage, and a strictly
lower o¤er from the other rm is also measurable. Similarly, the set of workers
who receive the same acceptable o¤er of w from both rms is measurable. Let us
represent these measures by 1i (w;W ) and 
2(w;W ), respectively. Thus, givenW
and the acceptance strategy of the workers, the measure of workers hired by Firm i
is15
ti(W ) =
Z 1
0

2(w;W )
2
+ 1i (w;W )

dw;
12Given the Law of Large Numbers, this assumption is only for simplicity. All our results would
hold under the alternative assumption that each workers reservation wage is an independent
random draw from the same distribution.
13In the tradition of economics, we allow for vertical segments in the inverse supply correspon-
dence.
14If a rm does not want to make an o¤er to some workers, we simply set the wage o¤ered at
zero.
15By analogy to the Law of Large Numbers, we assume that the expected value exists and
coincides with the realized value with probability 1.
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and the wage bill for Firm i is
bi(W ) =
Z 1
0
w

2(w;W )
2
+ 1i (w;W )

dw:
Once this decentralized labor market has cleared, the rms produce. To max-
imize generality, we do not model the production process and the product market
competition in detail. We simply assume that given any amount of labor hired
by the other rm, t3 i, Firm is net revenue as a function of its own workforce is
R(ti; t3 i). This function is common knowledge and twice di¤erentiable. That is,
Firm is payo¤, given a vector of wage schedulesW , is
i(W ) = R(ti(W ); t3 i(W ))  bi(W ):
For some standard models of market competition, R would not be concave. Thus,
in order to obtain su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium, we need to make alternative
assumptions  su¢ cient conditions for optimality  on R. Below, the subscripts
of R represent partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding variable. Also,
taking advantage of symmetry, in all statements referring to R(:) of a rm, the rst
argument will refer to its own labor force, and the second to the labor employed by
the r ival.
Assumption 1 i) R11(to; tr) < 0, ii) R12(to; tr)  0, and iii) R11(to; tr)  2R12(to; tr)+
R22(to; tr)  0.
Assumption 1iii) implies that a rms payo¤ is concave in the amount of labor
that leaves the rivals rm to join the ranks of its workers.16 It is a strong assumption,
but only a su¢ cient one, far from being necessary. It allows us to characterize the
set of symmetric, pure strategy equilibria using the rst-order approach. As we will
see in Section 8, typical Cournot or Dixit models satisfy this assumption.
As a nal preliminary, let us present a result that will help in understanding the
nature of equilibrium strategies.
16Note that Assumption 1 implies, in particular, that R(t; t) is concave in t, and also that both
R1(t; t) and R1(t; t) R2(t; t) are decreasing in t.
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium in a symmetric17 duopsony, the law of one wage holds.
In other words, despite the exibility a¤orded by the model to o¤er di¤erent
wages to di¤erent workers, all the accepted o¤ers in equilibrium must be at a com-
mon wage.18
3 The benchmark case: no externalities
We start our analysis by looking at the benchmark situation, where there is no in-
teraction in the product market for example, because the rms are price takers.
Then a rms revenues do not depend on the amount of labor hired by its com-
petitors, so that R2(to; tr)  0. In this case, the partial derivative (with respect to
own labor) of net revenue, R1(to; :), captures a rms marginal willingness to pay
for labor when it has already hired to units. Therefore, the market clearing or
competitive outcome is dened by R1(tc; tc) = S(2tc) = wc.
Remark 1 It is important to note that, if the rms were price (wage) takers, the
outcome would still be (tc; wc) even with externalities in the product market: if a
rm cannot a¤ect the amount/price of labor its rival hires then it does not matter
 for the rms behavior in the labor market whether its revenues depend on the
rivals labor force.
Remark 2 A further relevant observation is that this competitive labor market equi-
librium is only competitive in a partial equilibrium sense. Firms willingness to pay
for labor does not equal price times marginal product of labor when the product mar-
ket is not competitive. The labor market clears and the wage equals rmswillingness
to pay but less labor is hired than in the generally competitive scenario (c.f. Stahl,
1988).
17Symmetry is only used to ensure that both rms are active.
18As we will see in Section 7, when there are more rms, this result will no longer hold.
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The following result shows that our wage setting game uniquely implements the
competitive outcome:19
Proposition 1 In the absence of externalities, the unique equilibrium outcome20
is market clearing: all hires are at the competitive wage, wc, and rms hire their
competitive labor demand, tc.
In equilibrium, each rm o¤ers wc to twice the amount of labor it wishes to hire at
this wage,21 so that each worker willing to accept wc receives two o¤ers. Given this,
no rm would like to attract another worker as she would require a wage above wc,
the rmswillingness to pay. Similarly, no rm would want to shed a worker, since
the wage is weakly below the rmswillingness to pay. Finally, there is no way to
hire any worker cheaper than for wc either, conrming the equilibrium. Uniqueness
can be established by observing that in equilibrium, practically by denition, there
cannot be a positive measure of workers hired at any wage other than wc.
This last observation explains why rms coordinate on making o¤ers to the same
set of workers, even if there are no externalities. Any worker, z, who only received
a single o¤er would have to be hired for her reservation wage (otherwise the hiring
rm would deviate and make a lower o¤er to her). But if this wage is lower than
any wage paid by the rival, then the rival would prot from not hiring that worker
and hiring z for " more than her reservation wage instead.
19Proposition 1 generalizes to asymmetric rms but in that case equilibrium requires the workers
to use a di¤erent tie-breaking rule (i.e. mixed strategy). See Theorem 1 in Burguet and Sákovics
(2015).
20We only consider deterministic wage schedules.
21O¤ the equilibrium path this may require the rm to hire more workers than it needs, though
it still has the option not to put them to work (in case overproduction would adversely a¤ect
prots in the product market).
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4 Market clearing with externalities
We now investigate the e¤ects of (product) market power on the equilibrium outcome
in the labor market by assuming that R2(to; tr) < 0. This externality does not only
imply that the marginal value of an additional worker depends on the labor force
of the rival. It has an additional more intricate consequence. When we totally
di¤erentiate R with respect to to we obtain
dR(to; tr)
dto
= R1(to; tr) +
tr
to
R2(to; tr):
Thus, all of a sudden, tr
to
, by which we represent the e¤ect an innitesimal change in
a rms own labor force has on its rivals (holding his strategy constant, of course),
comes to the fore. The crucial observation is that this e¤ect is determined en-
dogenously. Hiring an additional worker has a di¤erent e¤ect on a rms revenue
depending on whether the worker would have gone to the rival rm she is contested
or not. In the former case tr
to
=  1, while in the latter tr
to
= 0. Therefore, the
marginal value of attracting a worker away from a rival is the sum of two (positive)
e¤ects: R1(to; tr) and  R2(to; tr) per e¢ ciency unit. At the same time, the marginal
value of attracting an uncontested worker is simply the increase in net revenue due to
an increase in the rms labor force, R1(to; tr) just as in the benchmark case. This
increase is lower than for the case of a contested worker, since it does not include
the value of reducing the labor force, and then the output, of the competitor. As we
will see, in equilibrium each rm will seek to make o¤ers to the same pool of workers
as its rival resulting in all hired workers being contested and consequently they
have the higher marginal willingness to pay for them.
Proposition 2 In the presence of externalities, the competitive outcome (tc; wc)
is no longer supportable in equilibrium. Nonetheless, there exists an alternative
symmetric market clearing equilibrium, with each rm hiring t workers, paying
14
them the same wage w, where (t; w) solve22
R1(t
; t) R2(t; t) = S(2t) = w: (1)
Note that t and ware the market clearing employment and wage, when the
two rms make o¤ers to the same set of workers. When each worker is contested
then decreasing to will increase tr by the same amount. Similarly, the best way
of increasing to is by outbidding the rival for some of the workers it would have
hired with positive probability. Thus, indeed the marginal valuation is given by
R1(to; tr) R2(to; tr). Market clearing then follows from similar arguments as in the
benchmark model.
Given that the market clears, and since it does not matter whether workers with
higher reservation wages receive the o¤er or not, we have that
Remark 3 The outcome (t; w) can be implemented by posted prices (the same
o¤er, w, made to every worker) and therefore it does not rely on targeting o¤ers.23
To see why the competitive outcome is not an equilibrium, simply observe that
R1(t
c; tc) R2(tc; tc) = wc R2(tc; tc) > wc, so either rm has an incentive to outbid
its rival for some of the workers it would hire with probability half if the competitive
strategies were played. The following corollary is also immediate.
Corollary 1 w  wc and, therefore, t  tc. Moreover, the rst inequality is
strict unless labor supply is fully elastic, while the second is strict unless it is fully
inelastic.
22Note that Assumption 1iii) guarantees that prots are non negative at t. Indeed,
R(t; t)  wt =
Z t
0
((x) R1(t; t) R2(t; t)) dx
where (x) = R1(x; 2t x) R2(x; 2t x), and the result follows noticing that (x) is decreasing
from Assumption 1iii) and the inside of the integral is zero at x = t.
23See more on anonymity in Section 6.
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In other words, the rmsmarket power in the product market leads to higher
wages and increased employment, at least when the market clears. As we will see
next, the market may not always clear, but the e¤ects on wages and employment
are qualitatively similar in all equilibria.
5 Involuntary unemployment
Proposition 2 characterizes a focal equilibrium with supra-competitve wages. We
now show that there typically exist alternative equilibria, but they lead to even
higher wages and consequently to the existence of a pool of workers who would be
willing to work for the market wage but are not hired.
Proposition 3 Unless either24 R(t; t)   tw = 0 or the elasticity of supply is
zero, there exists t < t such that for each t 2 [t; t], there exists an equilibrium
where both rms o¤er
w = R1(t; t) R2(t; t)  S(2t) (2)
to (the same) 2t workers among those with reservation wage below w, and make no
acceptable o¤er to the rest. Moreover, all symmetric equilibria must be characterized
by such behavior for some tc  t  t.
As we have seen in Proposition 2, when 2t measure of labor is hired the wage
equals the marginal workers reserve price, as well as the marginal willingness to pay
of the rms. On the other hand, for t < t, the inequality in (2) is generically strict
and thus we have an excess supply of labor. The root cause for this departure from
market clearing is the presence of an externality. A worker who would be willing to
accept the equilibrium wage may not receive an o¤er from Firm 1 for the mere fact
that she does not receive an o¤er from Firm 2.
24Non-negativity is guaranteed by Assumption 1iii. Given that we are studying rms with
(downstream) market power, positive prots sound intuitive. However, as we will see in Section 8,
it need not be the case: extremely simple and standard models. That is, input competition may
eliminate oligopoly rents!
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Finally, note that R1(t; t)  S(2t) and, therefore, tc  t as otherwise a rm
would prefer to hire additional workers (who would otherwise be unemployed). See
Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here.
As we have mentioned, we need Assumption 1 to guarantee that a symmetric
equilibrium exists, not that an equilibrium with unemployment exists. Indeed, con-
cavity of the revenue function on the ow of workers from the rival rm has two
implications that count here. Firstly, concavity guarantees second order conditions
for strategies identied in a rst order approach. This rst order approach always
identies candidate symmetric equilibria with and without unemployment. If the
revenue function is C2, strict local concavity at a candidate equilibrium with full
employment implies strict concavity for neighboring candidate equilibria with unem-
ployment. Secondly, concavity guarantees that a local best response(maximum)
is also a global one. Absent concavity, a rst order approach is not appropriate,
whether we refer to an equilibrium with or without unemployment.
The extent of multiplicity, and thus the maximum deviation in equilibrium from
the market-clearing wage (upwards) and quantity (downwards), positively depends
on the elasticity of supply and on the size of the production externality which is
likely to decrease with the number of rms.
The main insight of this section is that market power in the product market
creates segmented competition for otherwise homogeneous workers. Workers tar-
geted by rival rms become more valuable than untargeted workers. Targetability
separates each worker as a di¤erentiated market and so, even if rms do not have
market power in the labor market at large, they do in this more restricted, endoge-
nously di¤erentiated unit labor market. For some labor markets, targetability is
not a very plausible assumption. Firms often do not observe who their rivals o¤er
employment to, particularly when they are small in the labor market. Therefore, it
is of interest to see to what extent targetability is necessary for our ndings above.
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6 Anonymity
Assume that rms can decide how many o¤ers they make at what prices, but cannot
address particular o¤ers to particular workers. If we introduce only this modication
in our model, then we obtain the competitive equilibrium as the unique outcome.
Nonetheless, the mere fact of working for a rival rm constitutes a label that may be
used to target a worker. Then, we can model this ability of rms to second-hand
target in a dynamic way. If rms have a chance to react to rival o¤ers by targeting
new o¤ers to workers hired by the rivals, then as we will show the possibility of
endogenously segmented labor markets (and supra-competitive wages) reemerges.
Thus, suppose that a total mass of labor, T , may receive o¤ers from two rms.25
Firms do not observe the identity of the workers, so they can only decide how many
o¤ers to make at each wage. We investigate the existence of (symmetric, pure-
strategy) equilibria. To simplify the discussion, we restrict attention to equilibria
with a single wage.
Proposition 4 Without targeting, in the only pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium
with a single wage, the non-competitive market clearing outcome, (t; w), emerges.
The intuition behind the result is simple: if both rms send o¤ers with the same
wage, a rm attracts any worker that gets no other o¤er plus half the workers that
get the competing rms o¤er. By sending o¤ers with slightly higher wages, the rm
may increase (discrete jump) the conditional probability that an attracted worker
has received an o¤er from the rival, unless all the workers do get one. Thus, the
only possible such equilibrium must have all rms sending o¤ers to all workers, in
which case the reservation wage of any non-hired worker must be no less than the
wage paid in the industry. That is, we must have market clearing.
It is worth emphasizing that any other wage cannot be an equilibrium outcome,
not because this would give rms incentives to pay lower wages and still attract
25Until now, there was no need to specify the total mass of workers as the tail end of the
supply curve played no role: those workers would never be targeted.
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unemployed workers, but rather the opposite: rms would have incentives to increase
their wage o¤ers and so compete more ercely for (some) workers.
This observation indicates that the results in the static model with targeting are
not artifacts of the inability of rms to react to competing rmso¤ers. In fact, as
we show next, if we allow somedynamics into our model we do not even need to
assume targetability of workers to get equilibrium unemployment. Indeed, assume
that rms observe which workers have been hired by the rival, and may have a
chance to send new o¤ers to those workers before production takes place. Also, let
us maintain the assumption that o¤ers are binding for rms, but workers can freely
walk out of a contract. Finally, suppose that, before actual production takes place
and after all initial o¤ers have been made and accepted, nature selects each rm
with equal probability, and the selected rm has a new opportunity to send new
o¤ers. This time, rms can di¤erentiate between workers that have been hired by
the rival rm.
In addition to Assumption 1, let us assume that R22 > 0. Also, to simplify
the analysis, let us assume that each rm makes all o¤ers with the same wage,
although di¤erent rms may set di¤erent wages. Further, we assume that in the
second period only the workers hired in the rst period may receive o¤ers. Given
the analysis previously displayed in this paper, the reader should convince him or
herself that this would be part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 5 In the anonymous game where each rm is equally likely to have
an (exclusive) chance to target new o¤ers at workers hired by the rival, there exist
equilibria where rms hire labor t each at wage w, where S 1(w) > 2t. That is,
there are equilibria with involuntary unemployment.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that unemployment equi-
libria with all rms o¤ering the same wage was impossible with no second move
because a rm had incentives to hire the same amount of workers with a slightly
higher wage. By doing so, the rm would signicantly reduce the labor hired by the
rival. Hence, that deviation would also result in less talent being hired no matter
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what happened in the second period. Now, if the other rm has an opportunity to
react, which occurs with 50% probability, it will basically ipthe labor distrib-
ution, so that it would be the deviating rival who would su¤er the loss. The joint
prots of the two rms would drop, and (in the most favorable case), the expected
prots of the deviating rm would still only be 50% of those joint prots.
7 Wage di¤erentials and market segmentation
Qualitatively, the preceding results that is, the non-existence of the competitive
equilibrium, the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium with higher wage and
employment and the existence of equilibria with involuntary unemployment do
not depend on the existence (or not) of any asymmetry between rms.26 Therefore,
for simplicity, we have presented them assuming symmetry. In this section, we wish
to discuss an additional equilibrium phenomenon that some forms of asymmetry
may induce: wage di¤erentials.
Once we allow for heterogeneous revenue functions, the structure of externalities
can be highly complex. Here we consider one of the simplest possible asymmetric
settings. Thus, suppose that the T workers for hire have the common reservation
wage r. The demand in this labor market comes from four rms, divided into two
groups, k = 1; 2. Firms are symmetric within groups and the net revenue function
of a rm depends only on the labor hired by the rm and its competitor in the
same group: Rk(tkown; t
k
other) for k = 1; 2. That is, the economy is divided into two
industries (output markets), each with two rms, i = 1; 2.27
We may now dene t1 and t2 as the solutions to (1) for the revenue functions R1
26With asymmetry, the equilibrium strategies of workers may have to be asymmetric as well.
27Note that we have introduced several types of heterogeneity: rst, we have di¤erent revenues
associated to the same labor composition across industries; second we have di¤erent interactions
between rms in the same industry across industries; third, there is heterogeneity in the interactions
between rms: the prots of a rm are a¤ected di¤erently by the labor market behavior of other
rms, depending on whether they are interacting only in the labor market or in the product market
as well.
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and R2, respectively, with inverse labor demand xed at S(t)  r. Let us consider
the case where 2(t1+t2)  T , rst. In this situation, the labor market is su¢ ciently
thick, so that labor decisions of rms in one industry need not a¤ect the residual
labor supply for the rms in the other industry. Indeed, considering Proposition 3,
it is straightforward to see that there are intervals

tk; tk

, k = 1; 2, such that for
any (t1; t2) 2 [t1; t1] [t2; t2], it is an equilibrium that each rm in industry k o¤ers
the wage Rk1(t
k; tk) Rk2(tk; tk) to 2tk workers, with no worker receiving o¤ers from
di¤erent industries.
Note that this implies that all of these equilibria but the equilibrium with em-
ployment levels (t1; t2) exhibit involuntary unemployment and supra-competitive
wages. Moreover, in all but a measure zero of these equilibria there will be an inter-
industry wage di¤erential: workers hired in an industry are all paid the same wage,
but (identical) workers employed in di¤erent industries earn di¤erent wages.
While the abundance of labor does allow for strategic independence, one should
not think that this abundance is what explains why wages can di¤er across indus-
tries. The possibility of a wage di¤erential is an unavoidable consequence of the
endogenous coordination of rms that was unveiled in Proposition 3. Indeed, con-
sider the case where the labor market is thin.28 That is, dene btk as the solution
to
r = Rk1(t; t);
for k = 1; 2, and assume that 2(bt1 +bt2) > T . Note that, as Rk2(t; t) < 0, this implies
that 2(t1 + t2) > T . Also, dene
 et1;et2 as the solution to the system
R11(t
1; t1) R12(t1; t1) = R21(t2; t2) R22(t2; t2);
2(t1 + t2) = T:
It is a simple exercise to show that, under Assumption 1iii), this solution exists
and is well dened. The next proposition shows that while
 et1;et2 is an equilibrium
labor allocation, resulting in equal wages for all hired workers, it is but one of a
28For simplicity, we assume that there would be excess demand even in the absence of within
industry externalities. This is not necessary for establishing inter-industry wage di¤erentials for a
thin labor market.
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continuum of equilibrium outcomes. In all the other equilibria, workers hired in
di¤erent industries earn di¤erent wages. To visualize the next proposition it is
helpful to refer to Figure 2.
Proposition 6 Let 2(bt1 + bt2) > T . For each (t1; t2) such that maxk Rk1(tk; tk) 
mink R
k
1(t
k; tk)   Rk2(tk; tk) and 2(t1 + t2) = T , there exists a symmetric-inside-
industries equilibrium with that labor assignment and wk = Rk1(t
k; tk) Rk2(tk; tk), k =
1; 2.
Insert Figure 2.
One can think of these equilibria as the combination of two single-industry ones
with inelastic labor supply, with the additional requirement that no rm from an-
other industry should be willing to poach a worker who is not targeted by its direct
competitor. In these equilibria the labor market is endogenously segmented: rms
of the same industry choose to compete for workers (only) with each other. Indeed,
each worker receives two o¤ers, both from rms in the same industry. This, in gen-
eral, leads to di¤erent wages in di¤erent industries, although within industry the
wages continue to be common. Just as when 2(t1 + t2)  T , some workers willing
to work for strictly less than the wages paid in both industries do not receive any
o¤er.
Although Proposition 6 does not describe all possible equilibria, there exists a
single alternative equilibrium outcome with a common wage, where all hired workers
receive (the same) o¤er from all four rms.
Proposition 7 There are only two possible symmetric-inside-industries labor as-
signments leading to an equilibrium outcome with a common wage:
 et1;et2 and
t1 = t2 = t with R11(t; t)  13R12(t; t) = R21(t; t)  13R22(t; t)  r.
Note that, despite the increased competition, the second equilibrium results in a
lower wage than the rst one. Indeed, in this equilibrium, rms have more di¢ culties
targeting workers that their rival would hire: each of the workers who receives an
o¤er from the rival also receives o¤ers from other, non-rival rms.
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8 A micro-foundation of the net revenue function
In the preceding sections, we have used a reduced-form approach to modelling pro-
duction and product market competition, positing general revenue functions. Of
course, we needed to impose some, seemingly strong, assumptions on these functions
to be able to prove our results. In this section we analyze a particular, standard
output-market competition model that satises Assumption 1: the (linear) Dixit
(1979) model of competition with di¤erentiated goods. We use the model, which in
the limit coincides with a linear Cournot model, to illustrate the results obtained.
We will also discuss some welfare properties for this particular model.
Thus, assume that the representative consumer has utility function U(m; q1; q2) =
m+
P
i
 
aqi   b2q2i   cq1q2

, where qi represents the output of Firm i, and m is the
rest of consumption numeraire. The resulting inverse demand for Firm is product
is
pi(qi; qj) = a  bqi   cqj:
If rms operate constant (normalized to unit) returns to scale technologies, then
their net revenues will be29
Ri(ti; tj) = (a  bti   ctj) ti:
Thus, Assumption 1 is satised, as in this model R11(t1; t2) =  2b < 0, R12(t1; t2) =
 c < 0, and R11(t1; t2)  2R12(t1; t2)+R22(t1; t2) =  b+ c, which is negative as long
as the price of each good is more responsive to changes in its own quantity than to
changes in the quantity of the other good.
We may now compute the set of all symmetric equilibria that we have discussed
in previous sections. For that purpose, assume the supply of labor is innitely
elastic, S(t) = r < a for all t > 0. Then, the market-clearing equilibrium, discussed
29Here we abstract away from the possible complications that might arise from hiring labor in
advance. In that case rms may reduce output below the maximum that they could obtain using all
hired labor. This may be an optimal policy when the rival rm deviates from equilibrium behavior.
The analysis of these deviations would be more involved, but nothing fundamental would change.
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in Proposition 2 and characterized by R1(t; t)  R2(t; t) = a  2bt = r is
t =
a  r
2b
:
On the other hand, the upstream competitive level of employment is
tc =
a  r
2b+ c
:
That is the level at which R1(t; t) = a  2bt  ct = r. Note that indeed tc < t.
We can now obtain the set of symmetric equilibria that Proposition 3 refers to.
Corollary 2 In the linear, Dixit model with constant returns to scale and innitely
elastic labor supply, the set of symmetric-equilibrium employment levels is [t; t],
with the corresponding wage of a  2bt  r for a given t, where
t =
a  r
2b+ c  c2
2b c
:
Note that tc < t, so all equilibria involve a higher than competitive employment.
It is straightforward to see that the e¢ cient (i.e., total surplus maximizing) labor
force (per rm) would be t = a r
b+c
 t. That is, the most e¢ cient of all the equilibria
is the market clearing, t. In fact, in this model total industry prots 2(R(t; t) wt)
are aligned with total surplus: they are larger the larger is t.
It is also interesting to consider the limit case, as c ! b. That limit case is the
homogeneous-product, Cournot competition. We obtain as a limit t = t = t =
a r
2b
> a r
3b
= tc, with wage equal to r (and rms making zero prot). Thus, consid-
ering the feedback across markets, market power in the output market is completely
bid away in the input market, and so e¢ ciency is fully restored in this particu-
lar case. Note that the limit case itself, with linear demand and constant returns,
satises R(t; t)   wt = 0; that explains the degenerate interval of symmetric
equilibria.
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9 Conclusion
We have explored the consequences of linkages between market power in the out-
put market and outcomes in upstream markets, particularly labor markets. When
workers are viewed as separate markets, rms have incentives to restrict rivalsac-
cess to labor, even when it is in abundant supply. This option to foreclose results
in higher wages and higher employment, alleviating the anti-competitive e¤ect of
(downstream) market power.
We need not specify which subset of workers the rms choose to bid for. Obvi-
ously, a number of productivity-irrelevant characteristics (gender, race, rst letter
of last name etc.) could serve this purpose and in that respect our model could also
be a useful vehicle for modelling discrimination (c.f. Mailath et al., 2000). Similarly,
by (re)interpreting the variable t as one measuring e¢ ciency units, our model could
easily accommodate workers with heterogeneous productivities.
It is revealing to note that the targetability of o¤ers is not necessary for the high
wage/employment result. Rather, it is the explicit consideration of each workers
decision over which o¤er to accept that matters. Targetability does lead to addi-
tional equilibria, which exhibit even higher wages, but lower employment, leading
to involuntary unemployment. These outcomes resemble those of e¢ ciency wage
models. The di¤erence is that the wage premium paid to hired workers is not an
instrument to motivate the workers, but a consequence of imperfect competition in
the product market. Due to the foreclosure e¤ect, rms are led to endogenously
coordinate and make o¤ers to the same subset of workers, while their willingness to
pay for an uncontested worker is strictly lower. This same endogenous coordination
may lead to inter-industry wage di¤erentials, even in the absence of any industry
specicities with respect to labor.
From an applied point of view, our analysis underscores the importance of care-
fully understanding the interplay of market-power rents and upstream competition
for the markets involved. Competition for inputs may not only transfer rents from
downstream rms to suppliers in this case, workers , but it may actually reduce
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the size of these rents, and in so doing restore, at least partially, e¢ ciency. It is
well understood that assessing the e¤ects and costs of market power, for instance
in merger analysis, cannot be satisfactorily done without paying due attention to
how the involved rms compete for their suppliers. This paper highlights one so far
neglected intricacy that may characterize this competition.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that in equilibrium and in expectation a
measure  > 0 of workers accept o¤ers in [0; b] and a positive measure of workers
accept o¤ers in [c; d] for some 0  b < c  d: Take a rm that o¤ers in [c; d] to a
positive measure and denote by  > 0 the measure of workers it hires in expectation.
Similarly, denote by  2 [0; ] the expected measure of workers this same rm hires
for wages in [0; b]: Let  = min(   ; ): Assume rst that  < ; and therefore
 > 0: Now if our rm deviates and outbids its rival in [0; b] by " < c  b; for enough
workers so that it ends up in expectation with  +  workers for wages in [0; b+ "];
while it withdraws enough o¤ers from [c; d]; so that it hires   from that interval,
it increases its expected payo¤: net revenues from the product market stay the same
but the wagebill is strictly lower. If  = ; and therefore  = 0; then the o¤ers in
[a; b] are not to contested workers and by the above argument the other from cannot
be making o¤ers above b either, so it is driven out of the market.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. First, we show that rms o¤ering wc to 2tc workers in such a way that
each worker with reservation wage below wc receives exactly two o¤ers of which
she chooses one with equal probabilities is indeed an equilibrium. Suppose that
Firm 2 behaves according to the hypothetical equilibrium strategy, and consider the
best response of Firm 1: W1(:). There are two types of worker to target: there are
measure 2tc workers with an o¤er of wc and a reservation wage less than that, and
the rest of the workers who have a reservation wage above wc. Obviously, the rm
should hire workers in increasing order of their now perhaps determined by Firm
2´s o¤er reservation wage, until this wage equals marginal revenue. Thus, by the
denition of tc, the equilibrium strategy is indeed a best response.
We now show that there exists no other equilibrium outcome (with deterministic
wage schedules). Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a positive measure
of workers who get hired for a wage strictly below wc in equilibrium. Then there
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must exist a rm who would be willing to change a positive measure of its o¤ers and
instead o¤er " more to these workers, as the aggregate demand at infra-competitive
wage strictly exceeds the supply of workers. Consequently (almost) no worker can
be hired for less than wc. Similarly, assume, by way of contradiction, that there
is a positive measure of workers who get hired for a wage strictly above wc. Then
there must be workers with a reservation wage strictly below wc who do not receive
an acceptable o¤er, as the aggregate demand at supra-competitive wages is strictly
less than the supply of workers. Consequently, (almost) all the hired workers must
be paid wc. As no rm is willing to hire more than its competitive demand at wc,
there are always workers available for hire at this wage, so each rm must hire up
to its competitive quantity.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. To see that (tc; wc) cannot be sustained by an equilibrium, note that as
wc = R1(t
c; tc) < R1(t
c; tc)   R2(tc; tc), any rm would prefer to outbid its rival
by " on some of the workers and lower its o¤er to zero for other ones, so that in
expectation it hires the same amount of workers, but the rival hires strictly fewer.
The rest of the proposition follows from Proposition 3, proven below.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Note that Assumption 1, ii) and iii) and S 0  0, ensure that (t; w) is well
dened. We prove the rst part of the proposition by contradiction. Assume there
is no interval [t; t] such that for each t in the interval the equilibrium depicted in
the proposition exists. That implies that there exists a sequence tn " t, where, for
all n, Firm 1 has a better response than the proposed strategy to Firm 2 o¤ering
wn = R1(tn; tn) R2(tn; tn) to the 2tn workers with lowest reservation wage. Recall
that workers randomize 50-50 when receiving equal o¤ers. The response of Firm
1 amounts to nding quantities  of labor hired from the pool of 2tn who receive
o¤ers from Firm 2, and  of labor hired from the pool that does not receive o¤ers
from Firm 2. Indeed, that can always be done by o¤ering wn to 2 of the former30
and their reservation wage to workers in the interval (2tn; 2tn + ). For given  and
30If  > t then Firm 1 can o¤er w+ " to  workers.
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, the prot of Firm 1 is then (arbitrarily close to)
1(; ) = R( + ; 2tn   )  wn 
Z 2tn+
2tn
S(x)dx; (3)
with derivatives
d1(; )
d
= R1( + ; 2tn   ) R2( + ; 2tn   )  wn (4)
and
d1(; )
d
= R1( + ; 2tn   )  S(2tn + ): (5)
Note that d
1(;0)
d
= R1(; 2tn   )   R2(; 2tn   )   wn = R1(; 2tn   )  
R2(; 2tn   )  R1(tn; tn) + R2(tn; tn). Since d1(tn;0)d = 0, and R1   R2 is concave
in  from Assumption 1iii), we conclude that a best response given  = 0 is  = tn.
Thus, if there is a better response than the putative equilibrium strategy,  = tn,
 = 0, it must be with  > 0.
Let the sequence of best responses to ftng be denoted fn; ng. This sequence
is bounded, since R(t; t)   wt > 0 and 1(; ) < 0 for large enough  and/or
. Thus, it has accumulation points. Suppose (0; 0) is an accumulation point for
this sequence. Then, for some n large enough 1(n; n) is arbitrarily close to
R(0; 2t) = 0. This cannot be a best response, since 1(tn; 0) is arbitrarily close to
R(t; t)  wt > 0.
Thus, at any accumulation point
b; b, we have bt = b + b > 0. That means
that there exists a subsequence of fn; ng such that for n large R2(n+n; 2tn n)
is arbitrarily close to R2(bt; 2t   b) < 0. Since n > 0, (5) equals zero evaluated at
(n; n), so that R1(bt; 2t   b) = S(2t + b)  S(2t). Also, since (4) is not larger
than zero at these values (zero if n > 0), R1(bt; 2t   b)   R2(bt; 2t   b)  w =
R1(t
; t)  R2(t; t) = S(2t). As R2(bt; 2t   b) < 0, the two previous inequalities
are contradictory. Therefore, there cannot exist a sequence tn " t, where, for all n,
Firm 1 has a better response than the proposed strategy when Firm 2 follows that
strategy. This in turn proves that there has to exist a non-degenerate interval [t; t]
in which the proposed strategies are indeed an equilibrium.
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We now show that there is no other class of symmetric equilibria in pure wage
schedules. By Lemma 1 the wage o¤ers by both rms are identical for all the
workers that are hired. Assume all workers hired receive a wage di¤erent from
R1(t; t)   R2(t; t), where t is the amount of labor hired by each rm. If the wage
is larger than R1(t; t)   R2(t; t), then a rm would prot from withdrawing some
of its o¤ers, whereas if it is lower than that amount, then a rm would prot from
increasing its o¤ers to a small mass of workers, and so stealing (the other) half of
them from its rival. Thus, both rms must o¤er the same wage w = R1(t; t) R2(t; t)
to 2t workers, as each hire half of them. These 2t workers must accept, so their
reservation wage must be below w. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Let Firm 2 play its equilibrium strategy, and so o¤er wage w to an amount
of labor q2.31 Consider Firm 1s strategy consisting of sending o¤ers with the same
wage w (say, b of them) or slightly higher wages (say, a of them), and no o¤ers
with lower wages. Any of the a o¤ers would be accepted by the worker receiving it if
her reservation wage is lower than w, whereas each of the b ones would be accepted
with probability 2T q2
2T
by these same workers. Indeed, the probability that any
given o¤er of w made by Firm 1 is to a worker who also receives an o¤er from Firm
2 is q2
T
. Half of these workers will accept Firm 1s o¤er if w exceeds their reservation
wage. In addition, the probability that the o¤er is to a worker who does not receive
an o¤er from Firm 2 is T q2
T
, and then the o¤er will be accepted if w exceeds the
workers reservation wage. Similarly, we can compute the probability that Firm 2s
o¤er is accepted by a worker with reservation wage below w when these strategies
are used, as 2(T a) b
2T
. Thus, for a = 0; b > 0 to be a best response for Firm 1, these
31For a symmetric equilibrium with wages w, any o¤er below or above w must be rejected. O¤ers
above since o¤ers cannot be targeted will always have a positive probability of being accepted.
O¤ers below too, unless the rival rm o¤ers wage w to all workers. Symmetry would imply that
both rms do that, eliminating the possibility of o¤ers below w too.
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values would have to maximize32
R

S 1(w)
T

a+
2T   q2
2T
b

;
S 1(w)
T

2(T   a)  b
2T
q2

 wS
 1(w)
T

a+
2T   q2
2T
b

:
The rst order conditions for a = 0, b > 0 require
R1   q2
2T   q2R2 = w  R1  
q2
T
R2;
where we have omitted the arguments of the functions. Since R2 < 0, these condi-
tions are incompatible unless q2 = T . For b = q2 = T , the labor hired by each rm
is t = S
 1(w)
2
, so that we have demand equal to supply and the rst order conditions
imply
R1(t; t) R2(t; t) = w = S(2t);
as we wanted to show.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. We will show that there exist t and w with S 1(w) > 2t, and a symmetric
equilibrium where both rms hire t workers in the rst period with o¤ers w, and
send no new o¤ers in the second period. For that to be the case, each rm must
send q o¤ers of w, satisfying
t = q
S 1(w)
T
 2T   q
2T
: (6)
Suppose that Firm 2 does so, but Firm 1 deviates and sends q1 o¤ers with wage
w1. Consider w1  w, rst. It is straightforward that such a deviation can only
be protable if it leads Firm 1 to hire t1 = q
1
T
S 1(w1) > t. Firm 1s deviation also
a¤ects how much labor Firm 2 hires:
t2(t1; w1) = q
S 1(w)
T

1  t
1
S 1(w1)

: (7)
The rst term in the right hand side is measure of o¤ers sent by Firm 2, the second
is the probability that a worker that receives one has a reservation wage below w,
32The expression is written as if all o¤ers a included wage o¤er w. Note that the prots obtained
by the rm with a o¤ers just above w can be arbitrarily close to that expression.
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and the third term is the probability that one such worker has not received one of
the o¤ers sent by Firm 1.
First, it may be Firm 1 who has a chance to send new o¤ers. Then it solves the
problem
max
10

R(t1 + 1; t2(t1; w1) 1)  w1	 :
The rst order condition is
 = R1(t
1 + 1; t2(t1; w1) 1) R2
 
t1 + 1; t2(t1; w1) 1  w = 0: (8)
The objective function is concave (in 1) and continuous in [0; t2(t1; w1)]. Let the
solution be b1. Observe that
db1
dw1
=  
@t2
@w1
[R12  R22]
@=@1
 0;
since the denominator is negative and @t
2
@w1
> 0.
Now assume it is Firm 2 that can make new o¤ers. It solves a similar problem,
namely
max
22[0;t1]
R(t2(t1; w1) + 2; t1  2)  w12:
This optimization problem is also concave in 2, with rst order condition
R1(t
2(t1; w1) + 2; t1  2) R2(t2(t1; w1) + 2; t1  2)  w1 = 0: (9)
Let the solution be e2. Similarly as before, de2
dw1
 0.
Let us now consider the best deviation (with w1 > w) by Firm 1 in period 1.
The optimal (w1; t1) solves
max
w1w;t1t
1
2

R(bt1;bt2)  w1t1   w(bt1   t1) +R(et1;et2)  w1et1	 ;
where bt1 = t1 + b1, bt2 = t2(t1; w1)  b1, et1 = t1  e2, and et2 = t2(t1; w1) + e2. The
derivative of the objective function with respect to w1 is
1
2
"
 t1 + @bt1
@w1
 
R1(bt1;bt2)  w+ @bt2
@w1
R2(bt1;bt2)#
+
1
2
"
 et1 + @et1
@w1
 
R1(et1;et2)  w1+ @et2
@w1
R2(et1;et2)# :
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Note that @bt1
@w1
= d
b1
dw1
= @t
2
@w1
  @bt2
@w1
. Also, note that @et2
@w1
= d
e2
dw1
+ @t
2
@w1
=   @et1
@w1
+ @t
2
@w1
.
Thus, the expression above can be written as
1
2
"
 t1 + d
b1
dw1
 
R1(bt1;bt2) R2(bt1;bt2)  w+ @t2
@w1
R2(bt1;bt2)#
+
1
2
"
 et1   de2
dw1
 
R1(et1;et2) R2(et1;et2)  w1+ @t2
@w1
R2(et1;et2)# :
As we mentioned, de2
dw1
 0, and @t2
@w1
> 0 in (7). Also, note that R1(bt1;bt2)  
R2(bt1;bt2) = w, from (8). Thus, this whole expression can be seen to be negative if
R1(et1;et2) R2(et1;et2)  w1  0:
Note that et1 + et2 = bt1 + bt2 = t1 + t2(t1; w1), and so if et1 > et2, just as in the case of
(8), the inequality follows. Thus, we must have an optimizer at w (+) if et1  et2.
Note that, once again resorting to Assumption 1, taking into account the rst 
and secondorder condition for the optimal choice of Firm 2 (9) and the fact thatet1 + et2 = t1 + t2(t1; w1)  2t, indeed et1  et2.
Thus, any (optimal) deviation simply sets an amount of labor hired, t1 + t2(t1) 
2t, and then results in each rm choosing how much of it to hire at wage w with
probability 1/2. I.e., the best deviation results in a symmetric (expected) situation,
and so same expected prots, for both rms for each t1. In the region with t1  t,
and so t1+t2(t1)  2t, the expected prots are largest when, t1 = t, and so t2(t1) = t,
since for any t0 > t,
R(t; t)  wt > R(t0; t0)  wt0 
 1
2
R(t0 + ; t  ) + 1
2
R(t0   ; t+ )  t0w:
Indeed, the rst inequality follows from the fact that at given wage w, the derivative
of R(t0; t0)  wt0 with respect to t0 is
R1(t
0; t0) +R2(t0; t0)  w < R1(t0; t0) R2(t0; t0)  w;
and R1(t0; t0)   R2(t0; t0) is decreasing in t0. Thus, for w = R1(t; t)   R2(t; t), that
derivative is negative. The second follows from Assumption 1.
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Now, consider a deviation with w1 < w. Given w1, t1 would be given by
t1 = S 1(w1)
q1
T
(1  q
T
):
That is, t1 can be chosen to be any number in
h
0; S
 1(w1)
T
(T   q)
i
. Observe that (6)
implies that for w su¢ ciently close to w, q is arbitrarily close to T , so that this
interval is arbitrarily small. That is, t1 is arbitrarily small and so the R(t1; t2) w1t1
arbitrarily small. That is, smaller than R(t; t)  wt. Also, the maximum of R(t1 +
; t2  )  w1t1   w in  is attained arbitrarily close to  = t, since t1 + t2 is
arbitrarily close to 2t. Thus, the losses in case it is Firm 2 who is allowed to send
new o¤ers more than o¤set any possible gains in case Firm 1 is allowed to readjust
employment. This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. First, note that the system of inequalities
2(t1 + t2) = T;
max
k
Rk1(t
k; tk)  min
k
 
Rk1(t
k; tk) Rk2(tk; tk)

;
has a continuum of solutions (t1; t2)  the interval connecting the two endpoints
of the rhombus in Figure 2. Let us consider any one of those solutions, and let
both rms in Industry 2 o¤er w2 = R21(t
2; t2)   R22(t2; t2) to the same 2t2 workers.
Also, assume that Firm 2 in Industry 1 o¤ers wage w1 = R11(t
1; t1)  R12(t1; t1). As
in the proof of Proposition 3, the best response for Firm 1 in Industry 1 may be
characterized as choosing  and  so as to maximize
11(; ) = R
1( + ; 2t1   )  w1  w2;
which is the same expression as (3) specialized for S(t) = w2. The result then follows
from Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. We start by showing that in any equilibrium with a common wage and with
a symmetric-inside-industries talent outcome (almost) all workers receive a highest
o¤er from either both or none of the rms in each industry. Note that, since we
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are dealing with equilibrium outcomes without price dispersion, all hired workers
receive the same highest o¤er w. Assume that in (at least) one industry, say 1; only
one rm makes this o¤er. Then w must equal R11(t
1; t1). Then the other rm from
Industry 1, who is also hiring at wage w would benet from o¤ering some of these
workers a wage w +  with Rk1(t
k; tk) < w +  < Rk1(t
k; tk)   1
3
Rk2(t
k; tk), where the
1=3 is the worst case scenario, where the probability that the worker attracted
away is from the rival is lowest (that is, when she receives three other o¤ers).
It follows that either all rms make the same o¤er for all hired talent, or
rms divide the market by industry. In this second case, equilibrium requires
w = Rk1(t
k; tk)   Rk2(tk; tk), k = 1; 2; and in order for workers to accept o¤ers,
w  r. That implies that the inequality in the text of Proposition 6 is satised.
In case all rms make the highest o¤er w to all hired workers, each rm hires a
fourth of all talent hired. The wage must be equal to Rk1(t; t)   13Rk2(t; t), or else
a rm has incentives to either to hire less (when the wage is high), by dropping
some o¤ers (one fourth of which would have been accepted), or hire more (when the
wage is low) by increasing some o¤ers slightly (three fourths of which would have
been rejected), and then attract these workers one third of whom come from its
rival in the industry for certain. The if part is immediate: for outcomes satisfying
Proposition 6 it has been proved, and for the rest of cases it is a straightforward
exercise to check that the described strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Suppose Firm 2 sends 2t o¤ers with wage w = a  2bt, and let x represent
the total labor that Firm 1 hires, and  the labor that it hires (by sending o¤ers
 w but larger than w) from the pool of workers that receive o¤ers from Firm 2.
Since the uncontested workers are paid r, Firm 1s prot 1(x; ; t) has a positive
slope in  if and only if (c.f. (3) in the proof of Proposition 3)
x >
w   r
c
() t > tc = a  r
2b+ c
:
Thus, given x, the optimal , (x), equals x if the inequality is satised and 0 if it
is reversed.33 Also, 1(x; (x); t), is concave in x both to the right and to the left
33It is interesting to observe that the binding deviation from a symmetric putative equilibrium
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of w r
c
, and its derivative to the right of that value when (x) = x is zero at
x = t. Thus, we have a symmetric equilibrium if and only if the left derivative with
respect to x, evaluated at x = w r
c
is non-negative. This is the case if
t  t = a  r
2b+ c  c2
2b c
:
with a little lower measure of labor hired is not to hire more workers (either contested or uncon-
tested) rather, to drop all o¤ers to contested workers and hire some but fewer uncontested
ones.
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